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In his target article, Klein (2013) makes the important point 
that many approaches to studying memory neglect the function of 
memory, in particular its capacity to help predict the future. Here, 
we complement Klein’s argument in two ways. First, we point to 
an existing and well-developed research program that formalizes a 
functional approach to memory, exploring its adaptive nature. Sec-
ond, we illustrate how this approach can be applied to analyze reg-
ularities in social interactions, which memory might exploit to pre-
dict future interactions.
John R. Anderson and colleagues (Anderson and Milson, 
1989, Anderson and Schooler, 1991, Anderson and Schooler, 
2000 and Schooler and Anderson, 1997) developed the rational 
analysis of memory, in which they argued that much of memory 
performance, including forgetting, might be understood in terms 
of adaptation to the structure of the environment. The first key 
assumption of the rational analysis is that environmental stimuli 
make informational demands on the cognitive system that are met 
by retrieving memory traces associated with those stimuli. The sec-
ond assumption is that the memory system acts on the expectation 
that environmental stimuli tend to reoccur in predictable ways; the 
pattern of past encounters can, thus, predict the future need of in-
formation. The third assumption is that the memory system makes 
most accessible those traces that it predicts will be most useful in 
the future. Consequently, memory performance should reflect the 
patterns with which environmental stimuli occur and reoccur in 
the environment. For instance, more recently encountered stim-
uli will likely be encountered again. An adaptive memory system 
should make information about those stimuli more accessible be-
cause it is more likely to be needed. Conversely, the longer time in-
terval since the last encounter, the less likely the information will 
be needed in the future, and so it can and should be forgotten.
The rational analysis of memory has been incorporated into the 
declarative memory system of ACT-R, a formal cognitive archi-
tecture that models a broad range of cognitive tasks from subitiz-
ing (Peterson & Simon, 2000) and list learning (Anderson, Both-
ell, Lebiere, & Matessa, 1998) to the emergence of cooperation in 
the prisoner’s dilemma game (Kim, 2012) and the neural under-
pinnings of working and declarative memory (Borst & Anderson, 
2013). In ACT-R, the accessibility of a memory trace equals its acti-
vation level, which corresponds to its predicted probability of being 
needed. A functional view of memory, therefore, lies at the heart of 
a thriving cognitive science research program that provides a for-
mal, integrated theory of cognition (Anderson, 2007; http://act-r.
psy.cmu.edu).
As an example of the assumed relation between past and pre-
dicted future occurrence of an object, consider the time since one 
has last encountered an object in the world (recency). Forgetting 
functions describe how memory retention declines with recency. 
Memory retention typically declines as a power function with lon-
ger time intervals since encountering an object (Figure 1a). An-
derson and Schooler (1991) investigated whether this regularity 
in memory might reflect a statistical property of human environ-
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ments. They found, in fact, that forgetting functions match pat-
terns of word use. Specifically, encounter rates of words in the New 
York Times headlines (Figure 1b) and patterns of adult speech to 
children both show similar power functions with recency. Statis-
tical patterns of past encounters seem to provide powerful pre-
dictors of future encounters – and memory functions seem to ex-
ploit these regularities in the environment to bet on future needs 
of information.
Anderson (1990) based the notion of rational analysis on an 
evolutionary perspective on cognition, incorporating evolutionary 
optimization in his framework. This approach, thus, not only offers 
an explicit adaptive perspective on the predictive nature of mem-
ory, but, like Klein’s (2013) argument, it also has had an evolution-
ary foundation since its inception.1 This explicitly evolutionary ap-
proach, then, provides a clear starting point for Klein’s broader 
thesis that various aspects of memory (beyond the retention mem-
ory highlighted in the rational analysis) have adaptive function po-
tentially geared toward predicting the future.
Another important domain in which memory might exploit sta-
tistical regularities in the environment to predict the future is so-
cial contact. Specifically, given the social nature of humans, it may 
be beneficial to predict whom from one’s social environment one 
is likely to encounter again. Meeting, chatting with, and email-
ing other people requires the retrieval of information about them. 
Might memory use statistical regularities in social contact to pre-
dict future encounters? To test this possibility, we analyzed records 
of individual social contact (including email, face-to-face interac-
tions, phone calls, and letters) across a period of 739 days (Pachur, 
Schooler, & Stevens, 2013). Figure 1c shows that, similar to An-
derson and Schooler’s (1991) analyses of word use, the recency of 
previous social contact predicted probability of future contact in a 
power-law-like manner (Figure 1c). Patterns observed in memory 
and word usage can, thus, also be observed in social contact – and 
reflections of these patterns in memory could be used to predict so-
cial contact.
Why might social contact be a particularly critical environmen-
tal force shaping cognition? For one, social contact patterns can 
 
 
 
 
 
influence the evolution of cooperation (Krasnow et al., 2013 and Pa-
chur et al., 2013). The evolutionary stability of many strategies in 
cooperative situations depends on the probability of future inter-
action (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981 and Nowak, 2006). Recipro-
cal strategies such as tit-for-tat (copying your partner’s previous 
choice) and reputation-based strategies work only if future en-
counters are likely. Human memory may reflect patterns of social 
contact to predict the probability of future encounters of poten-
tially cooperative partners. This perspective implies that cognition 
(memory) and decision making (cooperative strategies) may have 
co-evolved to match structures in the social environment.
In summary, the rational analysis of memory provides a the-
oretical foundation for Klein’s (2013) contention that cognitive 
psychology should pay more attention to the functional basis of 
memory. Built with an evolutionary perspective in mind, this ap-
proach provides a formal framework for deriving quantitative 
predictions of both behavior and, through ACT-R, the underly-
ing cognitive processes and corresponding neural correlates. We 
have proposed that social contact may be a key aspect of the envi-
ronment to which our cognition has adapted. The more recently 
one has encountered a contact, the more likely one will encounter 
this person in the near future. This creates memory demands for 
retrieving information about these contacts, so memory should 
be adapted to cope with these demands. These patterns of social 
contact, then, have important implications for evolutionarily rele-
vant problems such as cooperation. This combination of assessing 
the structure of the environment and the cognitive capacities of 
the actors conceptually bridges the historically mechanistic cog-
nitive science approach and the typically more functional evolu-
tionary approach. As proposed by Simon (1956), we will not un-
derstand the human mind without considering both cognition 
and the environment.
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